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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the device of the constructive trust. But, necessarily, the law in this
area is still in a nebulous state, since these decisions have set out the law
in only two of a myriad of possible fact situations. Inevitably these
situations will arise, and even granting that the court will feel justified
in applying a constructive trust in every case, a comprehensive statute
would seem vastly preferable. The result would be a much more pre-
dictable law in this area, relieving the necessity for litigation and for
employing such a legal fiction each time an even slightly different set of
facts arises.
DAVID M. CLINARD.
Trade Regulation-Exclusive Dealing Arrangements-Effect on
Competition Required by Section 3 of the Clayton Act
Congress enacted Section 3 of the Clayton Act' in 1914. The intent
of Congress was to apply a narrower standard of legality to exclusive
dealing arrangements than was employed by the Sherman Act rule of
reason approach.2 The Act3 was designed to eliminate unreasonably
restrictive practices in their incipiency.
4
Section 3 covers both tying clauses and exclusive dealing contracts.5
"equitable principles," expressly reserving the question of whether or not N. C.
GEN. STAT. § 28-10 (1953) applied.
2- 229 N. C. 160, 47 S. E. 2d 845 (1948). Son killed both parents. This case
was clearly not within N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28-10, 30-4, or 52-19 (1953).
138 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §14 (1946).
'In Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U. S. 231, 238 (1918).
Justice Brandeis stated the rule of reason as follows: "The true test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby pro-
motes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competi-
tion. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts pecu-
liar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts."
238 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 14 (1946). Section 3 of the Clayton Act
provides that: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods...
whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale . .. on the condi-
tion, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use
or deal in the goods . . . of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where
the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or
understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monop-
oly in any line of commerce."
' Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U. S. 346, 356 (1922):
"The Clayton Act sought to reach the agreements embraced within its sphere in
their incipiency, and in the section under consideration to determine their legality
by specific tests of its own which declared illegal contracts of sale made upon the
agreement or understanding that the purchaser shall not deal in the goods of a
competitor or competitors of the seller, which may 'substantially lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly.'"
' North Carolina has a statute declaring such practices illegal per se, since there
is no qualifying clause therein. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(b) (Supp. 1953). See
also Note, 29 N. C. L. REv. 316 (1951).
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An example of a tying clause is where a manufacturer leases a tabulating
machine to a lessee, and as a condition of the lease, requires the lessee to
use in the machine only cards manufactured by the lessor.' On the
other hand, an exclusive dealing contract has a direct exclusionary effect
in the form of either a total requirements or an exclusive supply contract.
A total requirements contract compels a dealer to buy or lease his full
requirements of a product from the seller or lessor; the obvious result
is that all other competitors are foreclosed from doing business with the
dealer. An exclusive supply contract has the same effect by virtue of
a specific provision that the dealer will handle certain goods of the
supplier only and is forbidden to deal in goods of competitors of that
supplier.
Although Section 3 makes no distinction between tying clauses and
exclusive dealing contracts, courts have developed different standards of
legality for them. The primary purpose of tying restrictions is to sup-
press competition, 7 but there are many economic advantages attributed
to exclusive dealing contracts.8  Consequently, tying restrictions have
been held illegal per se,9 whereas exclusive dealing contracts have been
accorded more liberal treatment.
In applying Section 310 the meaning to be given the qualifying clause
presents the most difficult problem. The first case involving exclusive
dealing contracts to reach the United States Supreme Court was Stand-
ard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co." In a private suit by a manu-
facturer of dress patterns to enjoin a dealer from violating an "agency"
contract, the Court found that the contract was an exclusive dealing
restriction. 1 2  In view of the fact that the manufacturer controlled ap-
International Business Machines Corp. v. United States 298 U. S. 131 (1936).
' Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U. S. 293, 305-306 (1949).
'Id. at 306; Stockhausen, The Commercial and Anti-Trust Aspects of Term Re-
quirements Contracts, 23 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 412, 413-14 (1948).
o International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392 (1947).
10 Generally speaking, there are three methods by which a Section 3 suit arises:
(1) Department of Justice prosecution in a federal district court:
(2) Federal Trade Commission investigation and proceeding with right to
appeal from a Federal Trade Commission order direct to the United States
Court of Appeals; and
(3) Private suit in the federal courts. A Section 3 case may arise on an
injunction petition against a restrictive practice, a defense to a restrictive con-
tract enforcement action, or in a suit for treble damages for injury sustained on
account of the restrictive practice.
In the field of private litigation under Section 3 no case has been discovered
where treble damages were allowed a small buyer or dealer because of restrictions
imposed by an exclusive dealing contract. To allow recovery there must be not
only proof of a public injury, but also a causal connection between the violation
charged and injury claimed in addition to proof of the nature and extent of that
injury. See Libman v. Sun Oil Co., 127 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1954); Hudson
Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F. 2d 268, 274 (5th Cir. 1954).
11258 U. S. 346 (1922).
12 Exclusive agency contracts, vertical integrations, allocations of exclusive ter-
ritories, and refusals to deal are not covered by Section 3 of the Clayton Act. Also,
exclusive buying arrangements that commit the seller to trade exclusively with the
195]
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proximately 40 per cent of the 52,000 so-called pattern agencies in the
entire country, the Court concluded that such contracts came within the
prohibition of Section 3. The Court applied the "dominance" test, which
is to the effect that if the degree of domination of the market is sufficient
to justify the inference that competition had been or probably would be
lessened, then the alleged violator's exclusive dealing contracts are illegal
under the qualifying clause of Section 3. Twenty-seven years later came
the Standard Oil of California case 13 on a government prosecution,
14
which laid down a narrower rule called the test of substantiality. This
test is met when a substantial portion of the industry's business is fore-
closed by the restrictive arrangement. 5 Conversely, if the amount of
business foreclosed by a restrictive arrangement is insufficient to ad-
versely affect a substantial amount of competition, such arrangement is
not a violation of Section 3.
Since the Standard Oil of California decision, there has been much
uncertainty as to whether exclusive dealing contracts are illegal per se
if the defendant is doing a substantial amount of business, or whether the
amount of business foreclosed by the contracts is the major factor. 10
There is also a contention that the courts are inconsistent in their hold-
ings. And further, it is contended that the Federal Trade Commission
orders are closer to the rule of reason approach than are the court deci-
buyer are not covered by Section 3. See Federal Trade Commission v. Motion Pic-
ture Advertising Service Co., 344 U. S. 392 (1953).
" Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U. S. 293 (1949). Here
the defendant corporation had exclusive dealing contracts with 6000 independent
dealers representing 16% of the retail gasoline outlets through which $58,000,000
worth of gasoline was sold in the western area comprising seven states. Defendant,
the largest seller in the area, also had 23% of the industry's business although only
6.7% of it was obtained through defendant's exclusive dealing contracts. Six other
competitors had similar arrangements which foreclosed a total of 42.5% of the
market to more than 70 smaller companies. The length of defendant's contracts
varied from specified terms in some cases to year-to-year terms in others. The
Supreme Court held that in view of the substantiality of the affected proportion of
retail sales and widespread adoption of such contracts by the other large competi-
tors, the contracts created such a potential clog on competition that Section 3 was
violated.
" An examination of the FTC Docket of Complaints, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
(10th ed.) 40,021-406 (1954), reveals the fact that there has been a great increase
in Federal Trade Commission activities in this field against major companies in
various industries since the decision in Standard Oil Co. of California v. United
States, 337 U. S. 293 (1949).
1" For a discussion of the substantiality test applied in Standard Oil Co. of Cali-
fornia v. United States, 337 U. S. 293 (1949), see Note, 28 N. C. L. REv. 188
(1949).
1" See Sunderland, Antitrust Developments: A New Era for Competitive Pric-
ing, 41 A. B. A. J. 113 (1955) ; 18 FORD. L. RiV. 306 (1949) ; 35 IOWA L. RaV. 131
(1949) ; 19 U. OF Cix. L. REv. 163 (1950).
But see McLaren, Related Problems of "Requirements" Contracts and Acquisi-
tions in Vertical Integration under the Anti-Trust Laws. 45 ILL. L. Ray. 141
(1950) ; Schwartz, Potential Impairment of Compelition--The Impact of "Standard
Oil Co. of California v. United States" on the Standard of Legality under the
Clayton Act, 98 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 10 (1949).
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sions.' 7 A study of the cases reveals that a pattern is developing which
tends to show that the substantiality test laid down in the Standard
Oil of California case is being consistently applied by both the courts
and the Federal Trade Commission. That test has been universally
adopted even though a bare majority of the Supreme Court adhered to
it.' In testing for substantiality the inquiry goes beyond an ascertain-
ment of the amount of business done by the alleged violator and includes
such matters as a determination of the amount of business foreclosed by
the restrictive arrangement. Other economic factors are also of impor-
tance on the issue of substantiality. 19
The Richfield Oil case20 involved one of the big producers in the
western area. In 1950 Richfield did $36,000,000 worth of gasoline busi-
ness2 1 plus $3,650,000 worth of business in tires, batteries, and acces-
sories. Of the 2965 stations involved, there were over 4500 written
agreements of indefinite length and 3000 oral stipulations found to have
exclusionary effects. First of all, the exclusive dealing arrangements
had to be proved before substantiality of foreclosure of competition could
be determined. Richfield had two main types of stations which were
called leased out (L-O) stations and dealer stations. It was contended
that the L-O stations were created by Richfield and therefore were
agencies in fact. But the lease provisions containing fifteen clauses were
so elaborate and so worded as to make the lessees independent. A legal
estate of at least a tenancy at will was found to exist.2 2 Superimposed
upon these leases were oral requirements restrictions which, combined
with the leases, had the effect of establishing exclusive dealing arrange-
ments with the 1343 L-O stations. Dealer stations operated under 80
per cent requirements contracts which, without more, would not have
been fully exclusive dealing arrangements. Richfield further employed
restrictions in the form of painting agreements and restrictions against
" Sunderland, Antitrust Developments: A New Era for Competitive Pricing,
41 A. B. A. J. 113 (1955) ; 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (10th ed.) 14007 (1954)."8 Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U. S. 293 (1949). The
lower court decision was affirmed by a 5-4 vote.
"o See, e.g., Dictograph Products, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 217 F. 2d
821 (2d Cir. 1954), and Anchor Serum Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 217
F. 2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954). Both cases will be discussed later in this note.
2O United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S. D. Cal. 1951), aff'd
per curiam, 343 U. S. 922 (1952).
See Kahn, A Legal and Economic Appraisal of the "New Sherman au Clay-
ton Acts," 63 YALE L. J. 293, 315 n. 123 (1954) : "This absolute volume probably
amounted to less than 3% of the total gasoline sales in the area, though a sub-
stantially higher proportion of the sales through service stations alone."
"United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280, 290 (S. D. Cal. 1951):
"If we consider the provision for 24-hours' termination as valid, the lessee has, at
the worst, a tenancy at will.... And I am inclined to think that, because of the
conflict of the 24-hours' termination clause with the monthly rental provisions,
Courts would consider the tenancy created by the L-O agreements, at least, a
month-to-month tenancy terminable only upon the minimum notice required in such
cases."
1955]
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displaying unauthorized signs or operating unauthorized gasoline pumps.
These restrictions, together with their rigid enforcement by overwhelm-
ing coercion, precluded competitors from trading with the dealer stations.
Applying the substantiality test, the court, undoubtedly having in mind
that 55 per cent of the industry was tied up by restrictive arrangements
of the big producers, relied on the volume of business of Richfield under
the exclusive dealing arrangements, the number of such arrangements
employed by Richfield, and the coercion practiced in enforcing them, all
of which indicated that the objective was to restrain competition. There-
fore, the practices involved were held to violate Section 3 of the Clayton
Act.
In contrast to the finding of substantiality in the Richfield Oil case,
J. I. Case Co.2 3 is an example of a lack of substantiality. The defendant
in this case was the nation's third largest producer of farm machinery
doing a $108,000,000 business in 1948, which amounted to 7 per cent of
the total business in the industry. J. I. Case Co. required its 3738
dealers to handle its complete line of products24 under one year contracts
which were renewable. 1050 of the dealers handled J. I. Case Co.
products exclusively, but it was found that such arrangements were on
the dealers' own volition. 108 instances where pressure was applied to
restrict the dealers from trading with competitors were reported, but of
these only twenty-six instances were reported since 1946 and none in
1948. The court held that on the entire evidence there were no exclu-
sionary restrictions imposed on the dealers.
Thus, many facts had to be considered in both cases to determine
whether exclusive dealing practices were employed. In one case exclu-
sive dealing arrangements were proved, whereas in the other there were
no exclusionary understandings found except in 108 isolated instances.2 5
Two recent Court of Appeals decisions from different circuits have
applied the substantiality test. In the Dictograph Products case2 0 the
court in an opinion by Judge Medina stated that economic inquiry was
unnecessary after a finding of substantiality. But in determining the
question of substantiality, such facts were relied upon as the volume of
"2United States v. J. I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856 (D. Minn. 1951).
24 The policy employed by J. I. Case Co. and other producers in the farm ma-
chinery industry is that of full line forcing; its effect is to require a dealer to
handle the complete line of the producer's products as a condition of lease or pur-
chase of any of the producer's goods. Full line contracts are not restrictive under
Section 3 unless the dealer is precluded from handling competitors' products.
22 Proof of exclusive dealing agreements in most cases is not so difficult to
establish since the exclusionary provisions are usually incorporated in formal writ-
ten contracts. See Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U. S. 293
(1949); Dictograph Products, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 217 F. 2d 821
(2d Cir. 1954) ; Anchor Serum Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 217 F. 2d 867
(7th Cir. 1954).




business done under the defendant's written exclusive dealing contracts,
its third position in rank in the hearing aid industry, that it is one of three
large producers that use these contracts, that it controls 220 of the 1000
prime retail outlets, and that the defendant has maintained its position
during the post-war period of growth. Upon consideration of these
facts, probable adverse effect on competition was found.
In the other case, Anchor Serum Co. v. Federal Trade Conzmission9'
the court's opinion by Judge Major stated:
"There was no legal issue before the Commission as to whether
the contracts were illegal per se; the only legal issue before the
Commission, as it is here, was whether the contracts with their
restrictive provisions were calculated to have the proscribed effect
or consequences .... Only contracts which had the proscribed
effect were made unlawful [by Section 3].
''
28
The findings of the Federal Trade Commission were to the effect that de-
fendant had full requirements contracts with sixteen wholesalers, that it
was the largest producer of hog cholera serum and virus in the "lay"
producing group, and that the dollar volume of business with the sixteen
contract holders was substantial. In addition the Federal Trade Com-
mission found that $1,000,000 worth of business was done annually with
its two largest wholesale dealers who were the biggest distributors in the
enormous hog producing states of Iowa and Illinois; facts were shown
to prove that competition was completely stymied in certain instances
after the exclusive contracts were made in 1947. The inescapable in-
ference is that obligation of the dealers under the contracts caused it.
29
Here again the decision rests not only on volume of business done under
the restriction, but also leadership in the industry and number of outlets
foreclosed along with specific instances of eliminating competitors from
the market.
The fact that Federal Trade Commission orders are following the
substantiality pattern is illustrated by the Maico Co. case. 30 The Com-
mission remanded the case to the hearing examiner to determine the
substantiality of foreclosure of competition because he, in concluding that
Section 3 was violated, had found only the following: the petitioner's
rank in the hearing aid field, volume of business, and that there were
restrictive contracts with 123 distributors. Not a single case discussed
has held exclusive dealing contracts invalid on the meager evidence the
hearing examiner relied upon in the Maico Co. case. The Commission
217217 F. 2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954).
I8 d. at 870.
20 Id. at 873.
"0 The Maico Co., Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (9th ed.) 11,577 (F. T. C.
1952).
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requires evidence of the same type as the courts require, except that due
to its specialized nature, it is better equipped to probe more deeply into
the same complex relevant economic facts that the courts consider in
order to determine whether competitidn has been or probably will be
substantially lessened.31
From the foregoing it is apparent that the mere doing of a substantial
amount of business by an alleged violator is not sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the qualifying clause of Section 3. The major factor in
the substantiality test is the amount of business foreclosed by the exclu-
sive dealing arrangements. However, the courts do broaden an inquiry
to include such factors as the rank in the industry, practice in the indus-
try, number and per cent of outlets foreclosed, rigidity of enforcement
of the restrictive practices, alleged violator's share of the market, length
of the contracts, intent of the parties, availability of alternative ways of
obtaining an assured market, and the economic power and capacity of the
alleged violator to enforce restrictive provisions.
The fact that it is necessary to make an inquiry into the question of
substantiality makes it clear that exclusive dealing contracts or arrange-
ments are not legal per se. On the other hand, the fact that such inquiry
is made does not mean that the rule of reason is employed. The tech-
nique adopted to determine the question of substantiality is similar to
that in the rule of reason. But the analogy goes no further. Once sub-
stantiality is found to exist, these arrangements may be said to be illegal
per se because there is no further inquiry into the reasonableness or bene-
ficial effects that may, in fact, flow from such arrangements in a particu-
lar case. But it must be emphasized that the necessity of finding sub-
stantiality precludes such contracts from being per se illegal. Thus, it
appears that the courts and the Federal Trade Commission have carried
out the congressional intent in regard to exclusive dealing arrangements
by applying a test of legality that falls between the rule of reason and
illegality per se tests. JAMES R. STRICKLAND.
Trade Regulation-Robinson-Patman Act-Unjustified Price
Discrimination-Additional Requirements Necessary to
Constitute Violation of Section 2 (a).
Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Pat-
man Act,' prohibits an interstate seller from making certain price dis-
criminations. The section in part states:
3 Cf. Revlon Products Corporation, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (10th ed.)
25,184, notion to reopen denied, 125,249 (F. T. C. 1954); Beltone Hearing Aid
Co., 3 CCH TRADE RE. REP. (10th ed.) 125,397 (F. T. C. 1955) (Here the order
is not a final Commission order, but a hearing examiner's ruling.)
'38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §13 (19476), as amended, 49 STAT. 1526
(1938), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (Supp. 1952).
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